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INTRODUCTION 
There is widespread agreement that achieving the very substantial reductions 
in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions necessary to stabilize GHG 
concentrations at 450 to 750 parts per million (ppm) will require innovation 
and large-scale adoption of GHG-reducing technologies throughout the global 
energy system.1  The associated policy debate is therefore not so much over 
the importance of new technology per se in solving the climate problem, but 
rather over what the most effective policies and institutions are for achieving 
the dramatic technological changes and associated emission reductions 
necessary for stabilization. 
Although many policies and institutions relevant to green innovation have 
been discussed, one area to which relatively little attention has been paid until 
recently is intellectual property rights (IPRs).  The absence of attention may 
stem from the reality that IPRs are, by design, decentralized, market-driven 
incentives that presume appropriate market signals on the demand side.  In 
the area of green innovation, by contrast, the primary problem has been the 
absence of appropriate greenhouse gas (GHG) pricing and hence the 
absence of an appropriate demand side signal.  However, assuming the 
demand side problem is fixed (through interventions such as carbon taxes or 
cap and trade systems,)2 then the issue of how IPRs – and various 
alternatives to IPRs – can most usefully play a role in fostering the supply of 
green innovation will necessarily come to the fore.   
In this report, we provide an analysis of how IPRs, and alternatives to IPRs, 
might operate in green innovation.  Part I of the paper discusses the 
economics of green innovation, including the important role that will need to 
be played by the private sector.  Because of the critical role of the private 
sector, demand side issues will need to be fixed in order for there to be an 
appropriate level of green innovation.  Part II discusses the IPR issues, 
principally involving patents, that may arise if and when GHG externalities are 
addressed through the appropriate pricing of greenhouse gases.  Because 
these problems will primarily arise in the future (if at all), we rely heavily in this 
                                                     
1
 IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to 
the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing 
Team, Pachauri, R.K and Reisinger, A.(eds.)]. IPCC: Geneva, Switzerland, 2007.  
2
 For reviews of the policy options to limit greenhouse gas emissions, including the effect of such 
policies on private sector innovation, see Robert N. Stavins & Joseph Aldy, (Eds.), Architectures 
For Agreement:  Addressing Global Climate Change In The Post-Kyoto World , Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007; Richard B. Stewart & Jonathan B. Wiener, Reconstructing 
Climate Policy: Beyond Kyoto, Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute Press, 2003, 
available at: 
http://www.aei.org/publications/bookID.211/book_detail.asp . 
Programme paper: EEDP 08/03 
www.chathamhouse.org.uk 4 
part on analogies to current technological sectors (and sections thereof) that 
are currently experiencing difficulties. Part III addresses alternatives to 
traditional patents and exclusive licenses, including patent pools, liability 
rules, and prizes.   
Currently, more than 95% of global R&D takes place in OECD countries. 
Thus Parts II and III primarily address IPR difficulties for R&D in these 
countries.  However, if climate change is going to be addressed successfully, 
clean technology must be adopted globally.  Thus, in Part IV, we examine at 
some length the international context.  cuses on intellectual property buyouts, 
the potential for international R&D treaties, impediments to technology 
transfer that may be posed by IPRs, and the use of IPRs to stimulate 
indigenous innovation in developing countries. 
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I.  ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 
While the idea of balancing the atmospheric GHG stock by reducing the net 
GHG flow to zero seems simple enough, the technological reality of what it 
will take to do this is far from simple. Currently 69 percent of global 
anthropogenic GHG emissions come from fossil fuels such as oil, coal, and 
natural gas, which satisfy 81 percent of global energy supply.3 The remainder 
of global energy is supplied by renewable energy (13 percent) and nuclear 
power (6 percent).4 Stabilizing GHG concentrations will therefore require 
large-scale and widespread substitution toward energy technologies with low 
to zero net GHG emissions throughout the global energy system.  New 
technologies may also be needed in other sectors to reduce GHG emissions, 
such as improved agricultural methods or crop varieties to reduce the 
conversion of forests (which sequester carbon) to farmland; improved 
technologies for biofuels that avoid raising corn prices and thereby spurring 
deforestation; and improved agricultural techniques to produce crops and 
raise ruminant animals with reduced emissions of methane and nitrous oxide. 
To gauge, in economic terms, the magnitude of the innovation challenge 
presented by climate change, it is helpful to consider possible targets for 
GHG reduction and the projected costs of achieving these targets.5 These 
projected costs, most commonly measured in terms of reduced Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), indicate the scale of the benefit that could come 
from innovations that significantly reduce (or eliminate) the cost disadvantage 
of climate-friendly technologies relative to the competition. Many proposals, 
and most analyses, have centered on reduction paths that are consistent with 
ultimate stabilization targets in the range of 450-550 ppm CO2. Modeling 
scenarios of cost-effective global climate mitigation policy suggest that, for 
targets in this range, the cost of GHG mitigation through 2050 is trillions or 
tens of trillions of dollars of discounted GDP, or an annualized cost in the tens 
to hundreds of billions per year. Longer-term total costs through 2100 are 
approximately double this amount. While these estimates are based on 
numerous economic and policy assumptions, they give a sense of the 
magnitude of the payoff from innovations that could significantly lower the 
cost of achieving various GHG reduction goals. 
                                                     
3
 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2007, Paris: IEA/OECD, 2007.  IEA, CO2 Emissions from Fuel 
Combustion: Emissions of CO2, CH4, N2O, HFC, PFC, FS6, Vol 2007 release 01. Paris: 
OECD/IEA, 2007.    
4
  IEA, World Energy Outlook 2007. 
5
 Richard G. Newell, A U.S. Innovation Strategy for Climate Change Mitigation, Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution, Forthcoming 2009.  
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Many studies demonstrate the central role that the availability and cost of 
advanced energy technologies plays in determining the cost of achieving 
various GHG reduction goals.6 Virtually all studies find that a cost-effective 
technology solution entails a mix of energy efficiency, low-GHG energy 
supply, as well as emission reductions in non-CO2 GHGs. Thus, R&D 
supporting such a transition must also be broad based, covering a wide range 
of technological opportunities. For example, one study finds that if we were 
limited to technologies available in 2005, the present value cost of achieving 
stabilization at 550 ppm CO2 would be over $20 trillion greater than with 
expected developments in energy efficiency, hydrogen energy technologies, 
advanced bioenergy, and wind and solar technologies.7 While it is not 
typically made explicit in these models, they presume a significant degree of 
innovative effort in the form of R&D, learning, and diffusion of new 
technologies that would have to underpin these assumed technological 
improvements.  
Other studies have found that accelerated technology development offers the 
potential to dramatically reduce the costs of stabilization, with advanced 
technology scenarios reducing the cumulative costs of stabilization by 50 
percent or more, yielding economic benefits of hundreds of billions to trillions 
of dollars globally (Figure 1).8 While one might reasonably argue over detailed 
modeling assumptions, these and other results demonstrate that 
technological advances have the potential to significantly decrease the costs 
of attaining societal goals for climate change mitigation. The challenge is to 
structure policy to maximize the likelihood that we will harness these 
technological opportunities as effectively and efficiently as possible.  
With respect to technological innovation, both the public and private sector 
play a critical role.  However, in terms of scale, the private sector is currently 
the major actor.  One useful indicator of innovative activity is R&D spending.  
Industry is by far the largest player in R&D spending, funding over 60 percent 
and performing almost 70 percent of R&D globally in 2006 (the most recent 
year for which complete data are available). This industrial R&D is stimulated 
by market demand for technologically advanced products and processes.  
Establishing a GHG emission price (through policies such as cap-and-trade 
and emission taxes) is thus essential from a technology perspective: such 
pricing creates a demand-driven, profit-based incentive for the private sector 
to gain from selling low-GHG products that are currently available and, more 
                                                     
6
  IPCC, Op. Cit.  
7
  Jae Edmonds et al., Global Energy Technology Strategy: Addressing Climate Change, 2007, 
available at: http://www.pnl.gov/gtsp/docs/infind/cover.pdf  
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importantly, to invest effort in developing new, lower-cost climate-friendly 
innovations.  
If private-sector profit incentives are not clearly aligned with societal GHG 
reduction goals then any public R&D spending will likely push against an 
insurmountable tide.  Conveniently, as discussed further in Part IV, the vast 
majority of innovative effort globally currently takes place in the developed 
countries that are expected to take the most significant initial steps towards 
implementing GHG emission pricing.  
For GHG emission policy to provide an effective inducement to innovation, 
however, it is critical that the policy be credible to the private sector over the 
long-term. Given the sometimes substantial time lags between initial 
discovery and profitable market penetration, companies must be confident 
that there will indeed be sufficient demand once their innovations reach the 
market. Such confidence would be increased by domestic policies and 
international agreements that put in place GHG emission targets whose 
stringency is spelled out for many decades in advance, and that provide 
stable financial incentives across a wide array of technological solutions.   
Of course, government funding of relevant basic research does exist and 
could  grow beyond its current levels.  Thus the discussion below addresses 
at some length the special IPR issues raised by publicly funded research. 
II. GREEN TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A SURVEY 
OF THE CENTRAL QUESTIONS 
As discussed in Section I, innovation in the climate mitigation arena faces an 
environmental externality problem not raised by other types of innovation.  
The GHG externality must be addressed on the technology demand side, by 
putting a price on greenhouse gases.  But the GHG externality does not 
represent the only potential barrier to innovation.  In this section, we address 
IPR issues that need to be thought through, particularly as the GHG 
externality is increasingly addressed. 
In recent years, a few analysts have begun to address how IPRs might affect 
the development of green technologies.  Given the early stage of research in 
certain areas, and in the absence of appropriate GHG pricing in most of the 
world, this analysis is necessarily quite speculative.  Nonetheless, some 
analysts have suggested reasons why patenting and associated restrictive 
                                                                                                                              
8
 Richard G. Newell, Op. Cit.  
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practices might pose impediments to creation and diffusion of climate-friendly 
technologies.  In contrast, others have seen little current evidence of 
dysfunction and have suggested that strong patent rights may assist in the 
development and dissemination of environmentally friendly technologies.  
Unfortunately, given the relatively nascent stage of much of the technology, 
there is little compelling empirical evidence to support either point of view.   
At the moment, green technology looks too heterogeneous to be subject to 
any across-the-board generalizations.  Unlike other heterogeneous 
technologies, moreover, (e.g., nanotechnology), the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO) does not recognize green technology as a class.  
Thus it is not necessarily easy to find reliable quantitative information about 
patent rights in green technology.   
However, there is considerable evidence that the patent system is not 
functioning effectively9 in some other areas of technology, particularly 
information technology and to some extent biotechnology.  Controversy over 
the existing system has spurred concerted efforts to implement patent reform 
in the United States.  It has also blocked attempts to further harmonize 
substantive patent law norms in a proposed WIPO treaty.10   
Accordingly, we begin this section by examining the operation of the patent 
system with respect to other technologies for which we have considerable 
evidence.  Because of the possibility that a significant percentage of green 
innovation may eventually have a publicly funded component, we pay special 
attention to the role of IPRs in areas such as biotechnology that rely 
substantially on public funding of relevant basic research.  We then discuss 
green innovation, both generally and in particular sectors.  In each of the 
major sectors, we suggest scenarios for the future by drawing upon the roles, 
both positive and negative, that IPR is playing in other, more developed areas 
of innovation. 
a.  The Existing Evidence for Other Technologies 
1.  Innovation Generally 
The economic and legal literature on IPRs has long recognized the positive 
role that such rights (and particularly patents) can play in the innovation 
                                                     
9
 For discussion of this evidence, see notes __ and accompanying text. 
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context.  The most obvious positive role involves the incentive effects that 
should emerge if the innovator can capture a substantial percentage of the 
very significant positive externalities associated with innovation (as defined to 
include initial invention, further development, and ultimate 
commercialization/diffusion).  Economists have estimated that social rates of 
return from innovation can be 30% or more.11  Although innovators should be 
able to capture some of this return through mechanisms such as head start 
advantages and trade secrecy, patents also represent a powerful 
mechanism.12 
A related, potentially positive, effect is the role patents can play in creating 
small-firm-driven “markets for technology.”  Economic theory suggests that 
patents should help to ensure that information retains its value even when it is 
disclosed outside the boundaries of the firm.13   In other words, patents 
should allow innovation rents to be appropriated even when a firm is not 
vertically integrated and thus cannot itself participate in all stages of the R&D 
process.  To the extent that a system of industrial organization that includes 
small firms and markets is likely to yield more innovation (particularly 
cumulative innovation) than a system that comprises only large, vertically 
integrated firms,14 patents’ role in promoting the former type of industrial 
organization is important.   
To some extent, the available empirical evidence backs these propositions on 
the positive role played by patents.  In particular, for small firms, patents do 
appear to play a positive role in attracting venture capital, particularly in the 
biotechnology industry.  One study reports that 50% of biotechnology firms 
that received venture capital (VC) backing in the late 1990s held patents;15 
moreover, this 50% is probably an underestimate, because (as discussed 
                                                                                                                              
10
 See, Jerome H. Reichman & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, “Harmonization Without Consensus: 
Critical Reflections on Drafting a Substantive Patent Law Treaty”, Duke Law Journal, Vol. 57, No. 
85, 2007, pp. 85-130.  
11
 See, Charles Jones, “Sources of U.S. Economic Growth in a World of Ideas”, American 
Economic Review, Vol.  92, No. 1, 2002, p. 220.    
12
 In general, empirical studies have found that social rates of return from private firm research 
and development are at least twice private rates of return.  Charles I. Jones & John C. Williams, 
“Measuring the Social Return to R&D”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 113, No. 4, 1998, 
p.1119.   
13
 See, Ashish Arora, Andrea Fosfuri and Alfonso Gambardella, “Markets for Technology and 
their Implications for Corporate Strategy”, Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2001, 
pp. 419-451. 
14
 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, New York: Harper & Brothers, 
1942, p.13 (making the theoretical point that entrepreneurial firms may be more likely than large 
firms with vested interests in existing products to be able to be able to move outside routine tasks 
into “untried technological possibilities”); see also William J. Baumol,  The Free-Market 
Innovation Machine: Analyzing the Growth Miracle of Capitalism, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2002; Zoltan Acs and David Audretsch, Innovation and Small Firms (MIT Press 1990); 
David Audretsch, Innovation and Industry Evolution, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995 
(presenting empirical data on the extent to which significant innovations in biotechnology and 
information technology have been driven by small firms). 
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further below) many biotechnology firms receive exclusive licenses on 
university-backed research.16 
For large, publicly traded firms, by contrast, the evidence indicates that in the 
1990s, U.S. patents had significant private value (i.e. value for appropriating 
returns from innovation) primarily in the chemical and pharmaceutical 
sectors.17  In the pharmaceutical and medical device sectors, the cost of 
regulatory approval for end products make patent protection for such products 
(or marketing exclusivities that resemble patent protection, such as those 
provided by the Orphan Drug Act) a virtual sine qua non.   
Patents can also pose obstacles for innovation.  Many of these obstacles 
consist of transaction cost problems that can arise in the licensing necessary 
for follow-on innovation.  For example, as a historical matter, progress in the 
automobile and aircraft industries was hampered by problems in licensing 
broad patents on foundational platforms.18   In other areas, problems 
associated with broad patents on research platforms were narrowly averted. 
In the area of computer hardware, the threat of broad patents loomed large 
until government action forced licensing of the AT&T transistor patent as well 
as patents obtained by Texas Instruments and Fairchild Instruments on 
integrated circuits.  As for software, it was already a robust industry before 
software patents became available, at least in any widespread fashion.     
A relatively small number of broad patents on foundational research do not 
represent the only potential difficulty.  There is also the possibility that a 
follow-on inventor will be deterred by the need to clear rights on a “thicket”19 
of overlapping patents20 that cover either a research platform or individual 
components of an end product.  In this regard, it bears mention that a 2003 IP 
survey of IP managers found that 23% said that competitor patents played an 
                                                                                                                              
15
 Ronald J. Mann and Thomas W. Sager, “Patents, Venture Capital, and Software Start-Ups”, 
Research Policy, Vo. 36, 2007, pp. 193-208. 
16
 Additionally, the late 1990s represented a time when venture capital markets were relatively 
robust.   
17
 James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers 
Put Innovators at Risk, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008, especially Chapters 5 and 6 
(collecting existing research data based on patent renewal statistics and market value 
regressions and presenting new data).; see also Wesley Cohen, Richard Nelson, & John Walsh, 
Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why Manufacturing Firms 
Patent (or Not), NBER Working Paper Series, No. 7752, Feb. 2000 (finding, based on survey 
conducted in 1990s, that R&D managers in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries ranked 
the effectiveness of patents higher than managers in other industries).  In fact, according to one 
analysis that relied on renewal data, market value regressions, and event studies in attempting to 
calculate both the private value of patents and the private costs of patent litigation, the net private 
incentive provided by the patent system outside the chemical and pharmaceutical industries had, 
by the late 1990s, turned negative.  See Bessen & Meurer, Op. Cit.  
18
 R.P. Merges & R.R. Nelson, “On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope”, Columbia Law 
Review, Vol. 90, No. 4, 1990, p. 839. 
19
 Carl Shapiro, “Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools and Standard 
Setting”,  in Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner & Scott Stern (eds), Innovation Policy and the Economy 
1, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001, pp. 119-150.  
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important role in decisions to abandon development of otherwise promising 
technologies.21  Currently, these problems appear to be most salient in the 
area of information and communications (ICT) technology.22  Not only do 
products in information technology represent combinations of dozens if not 
hundreds of patented components, but patent claims in this area often do not 
give clear notice of their boundaries. 
Even where patent thickets do not prevent projects from going forward,23 they 
create the potential for inefficient holdup.  If a follow-on improver has to clear 
rights on a plethora of patents with vague boundaries, it may either miss 
certain patents or simply not bother with the rights-clearing exercise.  The 
patent holder can then sue for infringement after the improver has already 
invested.  And to the extent that the patent holder is able credibly to assert 
the threat of injunctive relief, it may be able to appropriate from the improver 
far more than the value of their patent.   
Holdup problems are particularly salient in the related context of standard-
setting, where substantial investments in standards are often made prior to a 
patent holder’s coming forward to assert its claim.  Although these types of 
problems are usually associated with the ICT industries, they can arise in 
other industries.  Indeed, one prominent recent case of alleged patent abuse 
in a standard setting context directly involved environmental technology.  In 
this 2003 case, the Federal Trade Commission alleged that the Union Oil 
Company of California (“Unocal”) violated Section 5 of the FTC Act in falsely 
representing to the California Air Resources Board that it did not have 
relevant patent interests when it participated in a standard setting exercise 
involving the composition of low-emissions gasoline.  In fact, according to the 
FTC, Unocal had  begun the process of obtaining relevant patents.  After the 
standard had been adopted, and other refiners had made investments to 
comply with the standard, Unocal obtained and disclosed the patents.  When 
other refiners filed suit to have the patents declared invalid and not infringed, 
Unocal counterclaimed with a charge of infringement.  The court found 
Unocal’s patents valid and infringed and ordered the other refiners to pay 
royalties that could exceed $500 million.   
                                                                                                                              
20
 Patent law explicitly allows for overlapping, or blocking, patents. 
21
 Iain Cockburn & Rebecca Henderson, Survey Results from the 2003 Intellectual Property 
Owners Association Survey on Strategic Management of Intellectual Property, Oct. 2003, 
available at: 
http://www.ipo.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&Conte
ntFileID=55152  
22
 As discussed further below, the situation in biotechnology is less clear.  
23
 For example, there is some dispute about the extent to which firms in the information 
technology industries bother to examine the patent landscape.  To the extent that they do not do 
such examination, they may not be deterred by patent thickets.   
Programme paper: EEDP 08/03 
www.chathamhouse.org.uk 12 
In certain cases the potential problems caused by patents do not involve 
transaction cost difficulties associated with licensing foundational research for 
follow-on work or negotiating patent thickets.  Rather, the prospect of patents 
may lead to “too much” R&D – that is, rent-dissipating races.24  Moreover, 
because patent law sometimes allows multiple parties to own overlapping 
patents over what is essentially the same technology, some races may have 
multiple victors.  In that case, the overlapping patents held by multiple parties 
may lead to substantial, and expensive, litigation.  A case in point is 
microarray technology.  Microrrays are a powerful genomic research platform 
that involves depositing short DNA sequences on a support medium as a 
mechanism to test for gene expression.  Over the past decade, multiple firms 
(including Affymetrix, Hyseq, Incyte, and Oxford Gene Technologies) that 
raced to dominate the platform have tangled in court with respect to patents 
they hold on this platform.25  Although many of these suits have resulted in 
settlements involving cross-licensing, with the result that no firm is currently a 
monopoly provider, it is unclear whether microarray patents have, on balance, 
been beneficial.   
In the case of microarray technology, the overlapping patents held by multiple 
firms were arguably the consequence of an inefficient race.  In other cases, 
particularly in the information technology industry, firms may amass patent 
portfolios that overlap heavily with those of their competitors and are used 
almost exclusively for defensive purposes. Although this defensive 
accumulation of patents appears at best inefficient, and at worst can be used 
to exclude competitors that do not have such patents, eliminating defensive 
use poses an obvious collective action problem.    
Problems with foundational patents, patent thickets, races, and patent 
portfolios, are exacerbated when patents are of low quality.  Low quality can 
stem from patentability standards that are too lax or from the PTO’s failure to 
mandate compliance with those standards.  Low quality patents may cover 
inventions that are obvious.  Alternatively, they may claim too much inventive 
territory or fail to specify exactly what territory they cover.  In recent years, 
problems with low quality patents have been particularly salient in the ICT 
industries. 
                                                     
24
 Edmund Kitch bases his famous argument for granting broad patent rights very early in the 
R&D process on the idea that later grants would lead to such rent-dissipating races.  Edmund 
Kitch, “The Nature and Function of the Patent System”, Journal of Law & Economics, Vol. 20, No. 
2, 1977, pp. 265-290.  
25
 Richard Rouse and Gary Hardiman, “Microarray Technology: An Intellectual Property 
Retrospective”, Pharmacogenomics , Vol. 4, No. 5, 2003, pp. 623-632.  
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At least in the United States, some recent decisions by the Supreme Court 
may alleviate some of the problems caused by low-quality patents.  The 
Court’s 2007 decision in KSR v. Teleflex26 raises the patentability requirement 
of “nonobviousness” in a manner that calls into question many patents that 
represent combinations of previously known information.  Additionally, the 
Court’s 2006 decision in eBay v. MercExchange reverses prior patent law that 
appeared to mandate injunctive relief once a patent had been proved valid 
and infringed.  Under the Court’s new standard, district courts have discretion 
to award monetary damages rather than injunctions barring use of the 
patented invention, particularly when the patent in question covers only a 
small piece of the defendant’s product, and the patent holder is not a direct 
competitor of the infringer.27   
Interestingly, one of the first Federal Circuit cases to address a district court’s 
handling of damages post-eBay arises in the area of green technology.  In 
Paice v. Toyota, the patentee, a non-manufacturing entity, had sued Toyota 
for manufacturing cars that infringed patents covering a drive train for hybrid 
electric vehicles. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to 
deny permanent injunctive relief and instead order Toyota to pay Paice an 
“ongoing royalty.”28  The potentially significant effects of these Supreme Court 
decisions illustrate that assessments regarding whether patents are likely to 
hinder or promote innovation are subject to ongoing revision. 
On the other hand, even with new decisions from the courts, administrative 
processes are likely, for the foreseeable future, to continue to produce 
questionable patents.  In the United States, the available evidence indicates 
that the PTO struggles to keep quality at acceptable levels.  The PTO has 
fewer than 6000 examiners for the more than 400,000 patent applications 
filed each year.  So the typical examiner has only a few days to examine an 
application on which the applicant may have spent many months.  The 
examiner also bears the burden of proving a patent application is invalid. 
Moreover, under the complex incentive-based compensation regime for 
patent examiners, accumulating disposal credits (or “counts”) may be easier if 
the examiner grants a patent application rather than denying it.29  Similarly, 
                                                     
26
 KSR v. Teleflex, 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
27
 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).  
28
 The CAFC did, however, remand for the district court to reevaluate the royalty rate, as the 
opinion had given no reason for the decision to impose a fee of $25 for every Prius II, Toyota 
Highlander, Lexus RX400h manufactured during the remaining life of the infringed patent. 
29
 The question is not entirely clear because an examiner can also accumulate “counts” if a 
patent denial results in the applicant coming back with a repeat (or “continuation”) application. 
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the President of the European Patent Office has expressed concern that the 
patent system is “drifting towards dysfunctionality.”30   
In addition to false positives in the form of improperly granted patents, there is 
also some possibility of false negatives.  There are anecdotal reports that, in 
the last few years, the U.S. PTO has responded to complaints that it grants 
“too many” patents by routinely (and arbitrarily) denying patent applications 
the first time they are filed.  Certainly the evidence indicates that the 
percentage of first applications that are denied has gone up in the last few 
years.31   
Finally, in both the U.S. and Europe, there are very serious concerns about 
increasing time delays in patent examination.  In the U.S., total pendency for 
a first application rose from 25.9 months in 2003 to 31.9 months in 2007.   
Overall, the U.S. has a backlog of over 750,000 patent applications.  The 
delays caused by this backlog have particularly severe implications for small 
firms that may use patents to attract venture capital.  
2.  The Case of Biotechnology  
For purposes of thinking about green technology, biotechnology represents a 
particularly interesting area in which to investigate in some detail the effect of 
patents.  Not only will green technologies such as second and third 
generation biofuels be based on biotechnology but the green technology 
sector, like the biotechnology sector, is likely, in the long run, to rely heavily 
on complex interactions between publicly and privately funded research. 
The history of publicly funded research in biotechnology suggests several key 
lessons.  First, where the invention in question is a publicly funded research 
platform that can be adopted by industry without transfer of tacit knowledge or 
follow-on investment, the conventional rationale for patenting publicly funded 
research – that patents provide incentives for such knowledge transfer and 
investment – does not apply.  Many of biotechnology’s most useful, widely 
diffused platform technologies – including monoclonal antibodies and Maxam-
Gilbert sequencing – were generated through public funding and were not 
patented.  Second, if the publicly funded platform invention does happen to 
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 Alison Brimelow, “Closing remarks at the European Patent Forum”, European Patents Forum, 
May 2008, available at http://www.epo.org/about-us/events/epf2008/forum/details2/closing.html  
31
  Evidence of this percentage is a bit misleading because, under current U.S. rules, there is no 
such thing as a final denial of a patent application – rather, the applicant can file the same patent 
application as many times as he wishes.  But even taking account these continuation 
applications, the percentage of applications granted appears to have decreased in recent years.  
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be patented, nonexclusive licensing should be used to ensure maximum 
diffusion.  For example, although the Cohen-Boyer recombinant DNA 
technologies were patented, the University of California voluntarily converted 
its exclusive right into a liability rule—a non-exclusive “take and pay” rule—
under a standard form contract.32   Although such nonexclusive licensing 
increases costs relative to free technology transfer, modest licensing fees 
should not impose an undue burden on commercialization. 
Unfortunately, at least in the U.S., the available empirical evidence indicates 
that institutions that make decisions on whether to seek patents on their 
publicly funded research, and on how to license patents that they have 
secured, do not always make these decisions in a manner that comports with 
the public interest in efficient technology transfer.33  Thus there is reason to 
consider modifying laws such as Bayh-Dole that govern the patenting of 
publicly funded research, at least to the extent that they confer unfettered 
discretion over patenting to institutions that receive public funding. 
In the case of research tools and platforms that are privately developed, 
patents are likely to be necessary.  As noted, small firms that develop such 
platforms appear to need patents to attract venture capital.  Thus, for 
example, patents on polymerase chain reaction (PCR) technology may have 
been critical to the business model of the small firm, Cetus, that initially 
developed the technology.  But such patents may also pose problems.  Given 
the lack of an exemption for academic research in U.S. patent law,34 
academics who cannot afford to pay commercial licensing fees for a key 
patent must rely on the hope that the patent holder will refrain from suing 
academics.  Essentially, academics must hope that the patent holders 
engage in an informal regime of price discrimination.  This price discrimination 
ultimately arose in the case of PCR but only after some uncertainty.35  More 
generally, although academics appear routinely to ignore patents with 
impunity,36 routine lawbreaking is not necessarily a stable equilibrium.    
                                                                                                                              
N. Sampat, “Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?”, Stanford Public Law Working Paper No. 
999098, 2008, available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=999098  
32
  Jerome H. Reichman, “Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in 
Subpatentable Innovation”, Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol. 53, No. 6, pp. 1743-1798. 
33
 For a review of this evidence, see David Mowery et al., Ivory Tower and Industrial Innovation: 
University-Industry Technology Transfer Before and After the Bayh-Dole Act, Chicago: Stanford 
University Press, 2004.  
34
 See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002).  
35
 JH Reichman & J Giordano-Coltart, “A holistic approach to patents affecting frontier science: 
Lessons from the seminal genomic technology studies”, paper presented to the European Patent 
Forum, 6-7 May 2008; Ljubljana, Slovenia.  
36
 John P. Walsh, Charlene Cho and Wesley M. Cohen, "The View from the Bench: Patents, 
Material Transfers and Biomedical Research." Science, Vol. 309., No. 5743, 2005, pp. 2002 – 
2003. See also John P. Walsh, Charlene Cho and Wesley M. Cohen, “Where Excludability 
Matters: Material Versus Intellectual Property in Academic Biomedical Research”, Research 
Policy, Vol. 36. No. 8, 2007, pp. 1184-1203.    
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While biotechnology platforms like PCR and recombinant DNA were covered 
by a few patents with a single owner, other research platforms may be 
covered by multiple patents held by dispersed owners, public and private.  
Such thickets may become particularly salient in interdisciplinary research 
areas of biotechnology, such as synthetic biology, that draw not only upon the 
life sciences but also upon computer science and electrical engineering.37  
Although there is evidence that biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms may 
be able to avoid thickets through infringement that is secret (e.g. infringement 
of a research tool or process that is discovered only after the statute of 
limitations for lawsuits has expired) or by “off-shoring” research to countries 
with fewer patent restrictions,38 these are not necessarily strategies that 
should be encouraged.  In addition, secret infringement may not always be 
possible: for example, if (as discussed further below) synthetic biology’s goal 
of producing standardized biological parts is realized, the use of such 
standards may be apparent.  In that case, synthetic biology may be subject to 
the same possibility of holdup that we see in the information technology 
industries.39  Notably, even those analysts who are relatively optimistic about 
the transaction cost difficulties associated with thickets note that “even if 
patents do not stop ongoing research, the very prospect of a thicket or 
restricted access may dissuade researchers from choosing particular projects 
and limit lines of attack in that way.”40 
As with the legal picture in innovation generally, the legal picture in 
biotechnological innovation is not stable.  The KSR decision on 
nonobviousness may raise the bar for patents in interdisciplinary research: to 
the extent such research simply  combines well known knowledge in different 
fields, it may no longer be patentable.  The KSR decision may also lead to 
case law that makes it more difficult to secure gene patents. 
b.  Green Technologies  
With this overview of how patents work in other, more developed, 
technological areas, we can now consider how they may work in different 
sectors of green technology. Some key technological areas41 in which there 
exists some nascent evidence regarding the influence of patents include: 1) 
second and third generation biofuels; 2) thin-film (photovoltaic) solar; 3) 
                                                     
37
 Reichman & Giordano-Coltart, Op. Cit.  
38
 Walsh et al. 2003. 
39
 Arti K. Rai and Sapna Kumar, “Synthetic Biology: The Intellectual Property Puzzle”, Texas Law 
Review, Vol. 85, No. 7, 2007, pp. 1745–1768.  
40
 Wesley M. Cohen & John P. Walsh, “Real Impediments to Academic Biomedical Research”, 
Innovation Policy and Economics , Vol. 8, No. 1, 2008, p. 11. 
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transportation, specifically hybrid cars and fuel cells; and 4) wind energy.  
These sectors are at different stages of technological development.  For 
example, while third generation biofuels are still at a relatively early stage of 
development, wind energy and hybrid cars are already at the 
commercialization stage.  Not surprisingly, the areas in which we see some 
evidence of IPR-related problems – for example, wind and hybrid cars – are 
areas that are both further along commercially and where numbers of patents 
have increased in recent years.  (Figure 2)  But even in areas where we do 
not currently see difficulties, it bears emphasis that the situation may change 
as recent research bears fruit in the form of issued patents and as R&D 
escalates in response to appropriate GHG pricing.   
Second and Third Generation Biofuels 
As a purported green technology, the “first generation” biofuel of corn-based 
ethanol is quite controversial: it necessarily creates a conflict between the use 
of plants for food and fuel, and it has a carbon emissions profile similar to that 
of fossil fuels.   
In contrast, second and third generation biofuels are more promising.  Second 
generation biofuels include cellulosic ethanol, which is made from non-food 
crop residues such as corn stover and wheat straw, or from timber and 
lumber residues.  In the area of cellulosic ethanol, a major challenge is the 
phenomenon of “biomass recalcitrance,” a term that refers to the natural 
resistance of plant cell walls to microbial and enzymatic decomposition.42    
It thus appears that small firms are finding, and patenting, novel enzymes that 
catalyze such decomposition.  Then, in a pattern reminiscent of the 
biopharmaceutical industry, they are collaborating with large firms in a 
manner that develops the technology.43  To date, patents do not appear to 
have posed problems in this context – to the contrary, there are multiple joint 
ventures working on different enzymes, and patents on enzymes appear to 
have fostered markets for technology driven by small firms. More generally, 
as Figure 1 shows, the number of patents granted in the biofuels area (as in 
                                                                                                                              
41
 These are areas particularly important for developing countries. 
42
 Michael E. Himmel et al., “Biomass Recalcitrance: Engineering Plants and Enzymes for 
Biofuels Production”, Science, Vol. 315, No. 5813, 2007, pp.804-807. 
43
 Steve Suppan, Patents: Taken for Granted in Plans for a Global Biofuels Market, IATF Working 
Paper, 2007; see also John H. Barton, Intellectual Property and Access to Clean Energy 
Technologies in Developing Countries: An Analysis of Solar Photovoltaic, Biofuel and Wind 
Technologies, ICTSD Programme on Trade and the Environment, 2007, available at:  
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the biopharmaceutical industry) appears to be relatively small.44  Of course, 
the situation may change dramatically in the future, as more recent research 
in this area has not yet resulted in issued patents. 
Another source of worry may be patents in the area of third generation 
biofuels such as those produced by synthetic biology.  Unlike traditional 
recombinant DNA, which simply transfers one or more genes from one 
organism to another, synthetic biology aims to create standard, modular DNA 
parts that can be mixed and matched in different ways within a standard 
“chassis” organism.  In the biofuels context, the designer organisms created 
through mixing and matching would be designed to take cellulosic feedstock 
and produce fuel.  At the moment, synthetic biology is sufficiently removed 
from commercial application that current patent applications on items like 
microbial chasses (Craig Venter’s firm Synthetic Genomics has applications 
pending on several such chasses)45 are not likely to cover the inventions that 
will ultimately become the standard.  But to the extent standardization is 
achieved in the future, the prospect of patents on synthetic biology standards 
raises the same concerns as existing patents on various ICT standards.46  
Perhaps most notably, secret infringement, which (as discussed earlier)47 is 
currently one prominent strategy for avoiding patent thickets in the context of 
biotechnology, may be less feasible when relevant platforms are 
standardized. 
Photovoltaic Solar 
Photovoltaic technology involves the use of panels to produce electricity when 
the panel is exposed to sunlight.  While the first generation of this technology 
used crystalline silicon, the improvement process has involved applying thin 
films of semiconductors to the surface of materials like glass.  Another 
important piece of PV technology involves the inverter used to convert the DC 
power produced by the panels to AC power.  According to John Barton, who 
recently studied the photovoltaic industry, although industry players in the 
developed world do patent, the industry is only moderately concentrated, 
which allows choice among patented products that are substitutes for each 
other.   
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 See Todd Miller, James Peterson, and T. Christopher Tsang, “Patent Trends in the Cleantech 
Industry”, Intellectual Property & Technology Law Journal, Vol. 20, No. 10, 2008, pp.1-8 (noting 
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In terms of aggregate patent numbers, the trends do not appear particularly 
dramatic.  In the U.S., the number of patents issued annually in the solar area 
appear to be holding relatively steady (Fig. 2).   In the EPO, patent 
applications in the solar area grew about 11% between 1998 and 2007, lower 
than the 16% increase for alternative energy technologies generally.   
Transportation: Hybrid Cars and Fuel Cells 
As shown in Figure 2, many U.S. patents are currently being issued in the 
area of fuel cells.  Similarly, in the EPO, patent applications in the area of fuel 
cells grew 22% between 1998 and 2007.  In both this area and the area of 
wind energy (discussed next), many patents may represent relatively 
incremental improvements.  Thus, as with the information technology 
industries, an end product could conceivably be covered by a large number of 
patents, each of which contributes only a small percentage to the total value 
of the invention.  Indeed, the Paice v. Toyota case, discussed above, 
represented precisely this situation.     
Wind 
Because certain types of wind technology (e.g. windmills) have been 
available for decades, patenting in this space can also represent incremental 
innovation.  Additionally, as shown in Figure 2, the number of issued U.S. 
patents in this area have been increasing in recent years.  Similarly, in the 
EPO, patent applications in the area of wind power increased 31% from 1998 
to 2007.    
The wind turbine industry is also quite concentrated, with the top 4 firms 
accounting for almost 75% of the market.  In the U.S. market, General Electric 
is the major player, and it has a reputation for enforcing its patents 
aggressively.  For example, in February 2008 GE asked the U.S. International 
Trade Commission to bar imports of wind turbines made by Japan’s 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd., arguing that Mitsubishi’s turbines infringe on 
its patents. 
Proprietary Rights Beyond Patents 
There is more at stake here than patents alone.  Green technologies, 
particularly in the area of second and third generation biofuels, are likely to be 
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heavily dependent on access to microbial materials and associated data that 
will have to be processed as part of the overall research trajectory.48  The 
challenge is to enable scientists to access vast amounts of materials and data 
for upstream research, without compromising the possibilities of downstream 
commercial applications that may be patented. 
In other words, if all we focus on are potential patent problems, we may miss 
problems caused by data protection techniques under copyright and sui 
generis laws (especially the EU Database Law, which now applies in some 50 
countries) as well as  restrictions on access to genetic resources in material 
transfer agreements.  Our solutions would thus be incomplete because they 
would fail to address the risk that the scientific system, even when rendered 
compatible with traditional patent law, might be deprived of necessary data 
(covered perhaps by crown copyrights or crown database rights in the EU) or 
deprived of access to essential resource inputs, such as microbial strains held 
by repositories that restrict access to their holdings even for public scientific 
purposes. Hence efforts to design a worldwide microbial commons could 
significantly affect the pace and direction of patented technologies, including 
green technologies.49 
III. ALTERNATIVES TO TRADITIONAL PATENTING AND LICENSING 
We have already alluded to the need for legal change – perhaps most notably 
changes to administrative processes that currently do a poor job of granting 
high-quality patents in a timely manner.  But even without such legal change, 
which may be difficult to achieve, much can be done to avert patent 
difficulties. 
 a. Technology Pools 
A standard mechanism for addressing certain types of patent thickets is 
technology pools.  These pools function particularly well when multiple 
complementary patents owned by different parties cover a platform 
technology or standard.   Once the patents are pooled, licenses to the pool 
can then be made available both to contributors of relevant patents and to 
outsiders.   The MPEG-2 pool, which comprises patents essential for 
compliance with the MPEG-2 digital compression technology standard, 
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illustrates well the central features of a pro-competitive pool.   Contributing 
members of the pool agree to license the patent portfolio on a 
nondiscriminatory basis to all firms that request a portfolio license.  Owners of 
portfolio patents are also free to license their own patents independent of the 
portfolio.  The entity that administers the MPEG-2 pool is know as MPEG LA, 
and it receives an administrative fee out of royalties collected.  The MPEG LA 
model has been adopted in a large number of similar situations involving 
patent thickets.   
 As a conceptual matter, a package of innovations licensed under a non-
exclusive license of this kind invites the world to make use of the package at 
will, while organizing the contributors to the package as de facto partners of 
all subsequent users, who labor under a contractually specified obligation to 
pay reasonable royalties for follow on applications.  The more successful the 
package becomes, the more follow-on users it generates, and the greater are 
the “lottery effect” royalties paid to those who contribute to the package.50   
In certain contexts, royalty free licensing might be adopted.  In February 
2008, various firms launched the Eco-Patent Commons, which aims to pool 
clean technology patents for royalty-free licensing.  Thus far, the Commons is 
limited in scale. It includes 47 patents, 27 owned by IBM and 12 by Xerox.  
Other contributors include Nokia, Pitney Bowes, and Dupont.  Whether firms 
will have incentives to contribute significant numbers of patents to this type of 
commons, and whether it will include patents that are ultimately useful for 
reducing carbon emissions, remains to be seen.  In the context of other firm 
donations of patents to a commons (e.g. IBM’s donation of patents relevant to 
the Linux operating system), the firms in question have had a financial 
incentive to contribute, as they make products complementary to the 
platforms covered by the patents in the commons.   
b. Prizes 
In addition to the traditional approach of using patents/licensing and basic 
research funding administered via grants, another option is inducement prizes 
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for achieving specific advances in GHG-reducing science and technology. 51 
The idea here is to offer financial or other rewards for achieving specific 
innovation objectives that have been specified in advance.52  Prize-like 
approaches have also gained traction within the private sectors. Firms like 
Innocentive match “seekers” (organizations with challenging problems) with 
“solvers” (innovators with solutions) by offering them cash awards. Among 
other things, Innocentive has a philanthropic subprogram devoted to “clean 
tech and renewable energy” offering prizes supported by a private foundation. 
 Although inducement prizes are not suited to all research and innovation 
objectives, they have the potential to play a larger role alongside research 
contracts and grants. In contrast to these other instruments, prizes target and 
reward innovation outputs rather than inputs: the prize is paid only if the 
objective is attained. This can help encourage maximal research effort per 
dollar of public research funding. Prizes or awards can also help to focus 
efforts on specific high-priority objectives, without specifying how the goal is 
to be accomplished. Because prize competitors select themselves based on 
their own knowledge of their likelihood of success—rather than being selected 
in advance by a research manager—prizes can also attract a more diverse 
and potentially effective range of innovators from universities, other research 
institutions and the private sector. 
The detailed process of selecting appropriate prize topics and crafting prize-
specific rules (e.g., the type of contest, size of award, criteria for winning, 
method of choosing winner, whether patents will be sought on the targeted 
invention)53 requires extensive consultation with experts and potential 
participants. Identification of particular technical and scientific challenges in 
GHG mitigation that could be fruitfully addressed through an inducement prize 
approach could be identified as part of the above systematic assessment. 
Then the best institutional arrangements for administering the prize would 
need to be determined. Consideration would need to be given to the 
treatment of intellectual property arising from associated innovations (as with 
any joint R&D project), and to the development of terms for related licensing. 
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IV. INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
Thus far, we have focused on the intellectual property situation in the OECD 
context (and particularly the U.S. context).  This focus is justifiable to the 
extent that more than 95% of global R&D currently takes place in OECD 
countries. However, reduction of GHG emissions will necessarily be a global 
effort.  Thus in this Part we explicitly consider issues of technology transfer to 
developing countries as well as innovation in developing countries. 
a. Prizes and Other Funding in the International Context 
Prizes could be particularly useful for advancing innovation specifically 
relevant to developing country climate mitigation and adaptation technology 
needs, given the relatively low market-driven inducement for innovation that 
may be present in those countries.54 For similar reasons, the use of 
innovation prizes has been advocated for medical advances particularly 
relevant to developing countries (e.g., anti-malaria drugs).55 One advantage 
of a prize approach relative to research grants in an international context is 
that it would not require choosing the winner of R&D funding in advance, 
which can become politically charged when researchers and research 
institutions reside in particular countries.  
An internationally coordinated climate technology prize fund could be 
established for these purposes. While contributions for such a fund could be 
sought on an as-needed basis for specific projects, it would probably be 
advantageous to have larger-scale general funds that could then be 
prioritized to specific prize topics. 
In addition to a prize fund, a fund that provided peer-reviewed research grants 
could also be established.  A portion of this fund could be set aside for 
scientists and innovators in developing countries and thus provide them with 
opportunities and outlets for innovative proposals that do not otherwise exist 
at the present time.56 
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b.  Buying Out and Pooling Intellectual Property 
Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN 
FCCC) and WIPO could also consider establishing a “Global Fund” within the 
WIPO for the potential purchase of intellectual property. 57  The UN FCCC, 
adopted at Rio in 1992, already contains provisions for technology transfer 
and financial assistance for agreed incremental costs to developing countries.  
Its Kyoto Protocol added further assistance provisions.  And the demand-side 
incentives in a global regime that used a tax or cap and trade system to limit 
GHG emissions would spur a flow of funds and technology to developing 
countries in allowance sale transactions.  But the parties to the climate 
change treaties could go further to address IPRs through the collaboration 
with WIPO that we are now sketching.   
Specifically, a Global Fund could “buy out” selected intellectual property rights 
and then make the innovation available to others, especially developing 
countries, as if it were in the public domain or at least a semicommons.  An 
earlier proposal to this effect for pharmaceuticals was made by Professor 
Kevin Outterson, who pointed out that the aggregate value of the rights to 
poor country markets may be relatively small, in which case significant public 
health impact could be achieved with such an investment.58  Because the 
inventor will normally have recouped R&D expenses and made the bulk of his 
profits in OECD countries, such a strategy provides him with an extra source 
of income while relieving him of concerns about the enforcement of IPRs in 
the countries for which rights have been purchased.  However, thought must 
be given to the possibility of restricting re-exports of the products developed 
under such arrangements back into OECD countries under various theories of 
exhaustion, lest they undermine the innovator’s returns from investments in 
his primary markets. 
An organization that administered buyouts might also arrange to pool 
technologies or inputs to essential technologies, with a view to making them 
available as a package to innovators, especially innovators in developing 
countries.  This strategy looks promising and has already produced positive 
results in the pharmaceutical sector.  For example, public-private partnerships 
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have successfully pooled patented technologies under the auspices of DNDi, 
with a view to introducing two new malaria drugs onto the market.59   
c.  Technology Transfer and International R&D Agreements 
At least in the near term, much of the relevant R&D for clean technology will 
occur in the developed world.  Transferring the resulting technological 
knowledge and equipment to developing countries—and ensuring that 
technologies develop that are appropriate—will require additional actions at 
an international level. While technology-transfer strategies must address 
typical impediments to technology adoption, such as information availability 
and technological maturity, they also must address financing barriers specific 
to developing countries. The degree of intellectual property rights protection, 
rule of law, regulatory transparency, and market openness are also critical 
conditions and potential impediments bearing on technology transfer.  
Activities undertaken under knowledge sharing and coordination agreements 
can include meeting, planning, exchange of information, the coordination and 
harmonization of research agendas and measurement standards, and some 
degree of integrated, cooperative R&D.60 In addition to increasing 
international exchange of scientific and technical information, joint R&D can 
more directly increase cost-effectiveness through cost-sharing and reduced 
duplication of effort. The largest number of existing international agreements 
relevant to climate mitigation technology have been developed as so-called 
Technology Implementing Agreements under the auspices of the IEA.61 IEA 
Implementing Agreements use two primary mechanisms: task-sharing and 
cost-sharing. In task-sharing, a joint program is pursued within participating 
countries, but each country funds and implements its own contribution to the 
project. In cost-sharing, participating countries pool funding for a single 
contractor to perform a research task. There are 41 existing IEA 
Implementing Agreements, all of which incorporate task-sharing and about 
half of which have cost-sharing. They cover the fields of renewable energy 
and hydrogen (10), end-use energy efficiency (13), fossil-fuel technologies 
(6), nuclear fusion energy (9), and cross-cutting activities (3). Membership in 
these agreements is not restricted to governments or to IEA or OECD 
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countries, and a number of organizations from non-OECD countries have 
participated. Activities under these agreements are funded and conducted 
primarily through domestic R&D programs and budgets, and pooled funds 
often go to the bundling of research results and provision of a platform for 
information exchange and learning (i.e., desk studies rather than primary 
research).  
In addition, other agreements have also been developed in recent years, 
including the Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum, the Asia Pacific 
Partnership on Clean Development and Climate, and the International 
Partnership for a Hydrogen Economy.  Energy science and technology 
agreements that feature a higher degree of joint, collaborative R&D are less 
common, and appear to be most successful in research that is more 
fundamental and that has not yet accumulated commercial interests. 
Examples include the ITER fusion reactor and European Organization for 
Nuclear Research (CERN). 
Invigorated and expanded international agreements on climate technology 
mitigation R&D coordination could be very valuable, particularly as countries 
increase R&D efforts and seek maximal impact in addressing this global 
problem.62 The IEA is the best-positioned international institution to administer 
any such agreement(s) related to energy technology, although other 
international institutions may be more appropriate to engage for non-energy 
technologies. One concern with the existing IEA implementing agreements, 
however, is that they each have their own secretariats and operate 
independently. While this approach eases the need for more central 
administration, it may also suffer from overlap across agreements, and a lack 
of overall coordination and strategic vision. 
 G8, other major R&D-performing countries, and likely major developing 
country technology users, could therefore consider agreeing to an overall 
framework for knowledge-sharing and coordination of climate mitigation R&D 
efforts.63 This framework could include a process whereby parties make 
regular submissions of a climate technology development plan, including R&D 
funding levels, current and future program plans, pertinent R&D policies, and 
other relevant information. In addition to such national submissions, the 
process could include an evaluation of existing climate technology 
agreements—with an eye toward identifying best practices and expanding, 
integrating, or suspending particular agreements—and draw from other 
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related national level and international efforts by the European Union64, 
Japan,65 the United States,66 and IEA work in support of G8 and other 
processes.67  
At a minimum, the process would monitor progress, share information on 
individual national efforts in an integrated manner, and identify where 
overlaps and gaps exist across countries.68 One mechanism under this 
framework could also include the development of roadmaps to assess the 
current development status of particular technologies, systems, and relevant 
areas of underlying science, including the identification of appropriate 
milestones and necessary R&D funding levels. The framework would also 
provide a more systematic means for improving the cost-effectiveness of R&D 
by identifying particular areas where it makes sense for individual countries to 
focus on sub-parts of an integrated overall package and areas where joint 
funding is sensible. An agreement could also set out general guidelines for 
expectations for the magnitude of task-sharing and cost-sharing across 
countries for collaborative R&D projects. This framework could also highlight 
the importance of human talent to both knowledge development and transfer, 
by helping to identify high-priority areas for scholarly exchange—including 
from developing to developed countries.  
An international agreement could also be fashioned to increase domestic 
funding of climate technology R&D, analogous to internationally agreed 
emission targets for each country.69 International agreement over the 
necessary level and reasonable burden-sharing of R&D effort across parties 
could be valuable. Such an agreement could, for example, target a level of 
climate technology R&D as a percentage of GDP, or as a percentage 
increase from recent levels, with those levels set with the intention of 
significantly expanding R&D. The general idea is not without precedent: in 
2002 the European Union set the goal of increasing its relatively low level of 
overall R&D intensity—currently 1.8 percent of GDP—to 3 percent of GDP by 
2010.70 The goal is EU-wide rather than country-specific and applies jointly to 
both public and private R&D funding. However, there is little evidence of 
measurable progress toward the goal thus far, although ongoing discussions 
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among government representatives and major R&D-performing companies 
have illuminated many of the key impediments.  
A more detailed example—albeit in the medical rather than climate arena—is 
the 2005 proposal to the World Health Organization for a Treaty on Medical 
Research and Development.71 The core country obligations in the proposal 
are for minimum levels of support for qualified medical R&D (both general and 
“priority” areas), measured as a share of GDP, according to a schedule 
varying by national income. Among other things, the proposal also identifies 
methods of qualified R&D financing (e.g., direct public support, tax 
expenditures, philanthropic expenditures, and certain business R&D).  
Specifically with regard to energy, the IEA already collects annual data on 
public energy R&D spending by IEA countries, a process that could be 
adjusted if necessary to serve a more formal purpose.72 Such an agreement 
could incorporate a “pledge and review” structure, and the necessary 
reporting on funding levels integrated with the regular climate technology 
development plan submissions described above. Targets could be structured 
as a share of GDP, as a percentage increase from recent levels, or some 
other metric. The IEA could serve as the review body—either directly or as an 
assistant to a UNFCCC Expert Group on Technology Development. The 
process could also include a broader energy innovation policy review 
element: the IEA already conducts regular reviews of the energy policies, 
include energy technology policies, of IEA member countries and other major 
energy consumers and producers73 
d. Impediments to Technology Transfer, with Particular Regard to 
Intellectual Property Rights 
As we have discussed, IPRs provide incentives to invest in R&D and operate 
as modalities for recouping those investments and turning a profit, despite the 
intangible and essentially non-rivalrous character of intellectual creations in 
the raw state of affairs. To this end, the TRIPS Agreement of 1994, by 
harmonizing international minimum standards of intellectual property 
protection within the confines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, aimed to improve the baseline conditions for the transfer of 
knowledge and technology in a global marketplace.74 The “incipient 
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transnational system of innovation”75 emerging from this Agreement has 
created incentives and opportunities for entrepreneurs in developing countries 
once they become capable of producing and exporting knowledge goods to 
an increasingly competitive global market. 
In principle, this worldwide intellectual property system should encourage the 
transfer of climate-change technology to and from developing countries.  
Even if returns generated by IP protection in these countries are relatively 
small, the availability of such protection should stimulate some transfer as 
well as foreign direct investment (FDI).  Thus developing country 
governments should give careful thought to mechanisms for addressing the 
fears of foreign innovators regarding lax protection of their IPRs.  Besides 
implementing their enforcement obligations under TRIPS,76 governments 
should consider devising ways and means outside of their intellectual 
property and administrative laws to reassure companies that are willing to 
cooperate in transfers of essential technologies.  While states may not 
discriminate against other states with regard to such laws, a long GATT 
tradition does allow governments to make better deals with cooperative 
companies than with others who may drag their heels.   
On the negative side, however, there is evidence that the TRIPS Agreement 
has produced an adverse impact on access to essential public goods, 
especially in areas like public health and agriculture.  And when thinking 
about potential problems in advance of their becoming acute in the 
environmental sector, it is well to remember that although the TRIPS 
agreement sets up a baseline of protection, it also has a variety of provisions 
that give developing countries some flexibility in addressing access issues.  
Thus it is worth emphasizing that governments in developing countries can 
under TRIPS maintain relatively stiff standards of patentability.  Of course, 
stiff standards of eligibility must apply without discrimination to both national 
and foreign innovators.  But these same standards might widen the space in 
which local companies could reverse engineer foreign innovations that fail to 
qualify and still obtain, say, utility model rights or “compensatory liability” 
rights in incremental innovations of their own.  These same regimes might 
also serve to protect small-scale innovations held by foreigners, without 
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generating the thickets of rights and other barriers to entry that too many 
patents can produce. 
Even when foreign companies qualify for patent protection under suitably 
exigent domestic patent laws, the existence of second-tier regimes provides 
incentives to local firms to adapt such inventions to local circumstances and 
to improve upon them.  Moreover, the Japanese experience demonstrates 
that local firms that obtain second-tier rights of this kind in improvements then 
possess tradable rights that can become bargaining chips when dealing with 
large transnational corporations.  By the same token, the fact that a local 
company can obtain, say, only a utility model right or a liability regime at 
home, in no way affects the patentability of its innovation in other countries, 
especially OECD countries.  This is an important advantage of the 
“independence of patents” doctrine, incorporated into TRIPS,77 which 
developing countries could leverage in the environmental sector so as to 
generate more significant profits in countries with larger markets. 
Should tensions surrounding access in the environmental sector mount as 
they have in the pharmaceutical sector, the primary defensive options for 
developing countries would reside in article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement, 
which allows compulsory licenses to be issued on patented inventions for 
almost any reason, subject to the payment of compensation and certain other 
technical prerequisites.78 Here developing countries have a wide array of 
defensive options that must be carefully evaluated and duly supported by 
legislative and administrative provisions. 
For example, one of the most relevant and least studied of these options is 
the right to enact compulsory licenses for so-called dependent patents.79  
These licenses kick in when second comers develop patented improvements 
on existing dominant inventions, and they permit the improver to exercise his 
patent, despite its infringing posture, in exchange for a cross-license to and 
from the holder of a dominant patent.  In effect, this compulsory license 
avoids blocking effects by manufacturing a liability rule solution for improvers.   
Compulsory licenses for anticompetitive practices and behavior afford 
developing countries another set of options, especially when foreign firms 
refuse to deal with local firms or refuse to make technologies available at 
prices that local firms can afford.    
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While U.S. competition law would not necessarily support compulsory 
licenses on such grounds, they are fully established in international patent law 
and are increasingly invoked under the European Commission’s own 
competition law and policy, which closely regulates potential “abuses of a 
dominant position” by holders of IPRs.  Compulsory licenses issued for 
anticompetitive behavior under article 8, 31(k) and 40 of the TRIPS 
Agreement are subject to minimum restrictions and prerequisites, other than 
some administrative or judicial procedures, and even the right to 
compensation may be virtually nullified by such behavior. 
Another compulsory license that might be relevant to the environmental 
sector is the government use license.  Under a government use license, a 
private contractor may be made an agent of the government for purposes of 
manufacturing the patented product and making it available to the public at 
large. Such activity is immunized against an infringement action in the courts.  
Instead, the patentee must seek adequate compensation from the 
government itself, which can be measured in terms of local conditions.  
Government use licenses are also subject to very few prerequisites, they can 
be rapidly issued for virtually any reason, and the relevant transaction costs 
are low. 
Still another form of compulsory license widely used in the EU and elsewhere 
is the so-called “public interest” compulsory license.  On this approach, the 
government may enable third-party private contractors to produce the 
patented goods without license from the patentee, if the public interest 
requires the goods in question to be made available in greater quantities or at 
lower prices than the patentee is willing to accept.  Such licenses do require 
notice and prior negotiations with right holders, and prior negotiations 
themselves usually suffice to break the bottleneck in question without actual 
need to issue the license in the end.  Recently, in the context of public health 
needs, both France and Belgium have enacted laws allowing the issuance of 
expedited public interest compulsory licenses for public health purposes, 
although no such licenses have yet been issued.80   
It needs to be stressed, moreover, that the existence of these defensive 
measures gives rise to certain offensive possibilities if planning and 
coordination problems are otherwise properly managed.  Here we refer to 
interest in pooled procurement strategies that can enable poor countries to 
boost their bargaining power with respect to foreign suppliers of needed 
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technologies.81  From this perspective, there are gains of trade to be made 
when small countries coordinate their procurement strategies, especially 
when the objective is to stimulate foreign producers to lower the price of 
technologies or even to establish local production facilities in a given region.  
By pooling their purchasing requirements, countries may achieve economies 
of scale and scope that will entice foreign suppliers to deal on more favorable 
terms.  Moreover, coordinated procurement strategies toughen the threat of 
compulsory licenses—if all the participating  governments are willing to issue 
them—while sweetening the carrots of cooperative behavior by offering 
originators (or willing producers of substitutes) a larger market in which to 
establish their trademarks, sell their products, or even establish local 
production. Pooled procurement strategies with or without compulsory 
licenses look ever more promising in the pharmaceutical sector82 (where, 
however, special enabling legislation already exists),83 and they should be 
carefully evaluated for application in the environmental sector as well. 
However, most of these defensive measures are subject to certain technical, 
legal, and political constraints.  For example, a threat to issue a compulsory 
license may be meaningless if the country possesses no capacity to reverse-
engineer the product or process in question, unless it can obtain similar 
products from other countries where they are off patent or available under the 
doctrine of exhaustion.  Similarly, most compulsory licenses under article 
31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement must be made “predominantly for the supply of 
the local market,” which means no more than 49.9% of the production can be 
exported to another country (unless such exports can conceivably be justified 
as an “exception” within article 30).84  These restrictions can also hinder 
implementation of pooled procurement strategies, at least to the extent that 
they depend on compulsory licensing. 
Of course, climate mitigation technology is quite different from the 
pharmaceutical sector, in which many of these defensive measures have 
been used.  Because pharmaceutical products are generally quite 
inexpensive at marginal cost, developing countries have eagerly embraced 
such products (and have resisted attempts to raise cost through patent 
restrictions).  In contrast, absent GHG pricing, certain green technology can 
be more expensive than conventional technology even when sold at marginal 
cost.  Nonetheless these measures demonstrate that there are means for the 
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international community to address threats to the public good if and when 
IPRs become an impediment. 
e.  Indigenous Innovation in Developing Countries 
Much of the international climate negotiations, as well as the academic 
literature, have operated on the assumption that green climate-friendly 
technologies will primarily or exclusively be developed in wealthy countries, 
and will then need to be transferred to poor countries through private or public 
mechanisms.  This model of innovation in wealthy countries and diffusion to 
poor countries has characterized other fields of technology, such as 
pharmaceuticals (discussed above).  And it is underscored by the reality that 
95% of global R&D spending currently takes place in wealthy countries.   
But the future may hold significant potential for indigenous innovation of green 
climate-friendly technology within at least some developing countries.  If so, 
the global pattern of climate R&D will look different from that of prior 
technologies, and the need for technology transfer from OECD countries to 
others may be somewhat reduced.  At the same time, the promise of 
indigenous innovation in developing countries will require attention to the 
incentive systems operating within those developing countries.  The same 
choices and debates about the design and limits on IPRs and alternative 
incentive instruments, discussed above in the context of wealthy countries, 
will then arise anew in developing countries. 
There are several reasons to expect greater supply of indigenous 
technological innovation in developing countries regarding green energy or 
climate change, as contrasted to other fields of R&D.  First, the impetus for 
climate-friendly innovation will be greatest in the wealthiest of developing 
countries, not the poorest.  Unlike in the case of essential medicines, where 
the countries most in need are also the poorest with the least capacity to 
innovate, in the case of energy and climate technology the major developing 
countries most in need – that is, the largest emitting countries who will be 
most called on to reduce their emissions – are the wealthiest with the greatest 
capacity to innovate.  Growing greenhouse gas emissions usually (though not 
inevitably) correlates with rising energy use, electrification, vehicle ownership 
and distance traveled, and wealth.   
Notably, China, India, and Brazil are three of the largest greenhouse gas 
emitters in the world (China having surpassed the USA in 2007 to become the 
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world’s largest CO2 emitter).85  They are also three of the wealthiest 
developing countries.  Indeed they are emerging great powers.  They still 
have significantly lower per capita income than OECD countries, but their 
aggregate GDP is rising to the point that it equals or surpasses many OECD 
countries.  While GDP in Europe and the USA has been growing at about 2 or 
3 percent per year over the past decade, China’s GDP has been growing at 
over 10 percent per year over that period.  (On present forecasts, China may 
be the world’s largest economy with a decade or two, although the 2008 
economic crisis may reduce growth rates in both China and OECD countries.)   
Other major emitters among developing countries, such as Indonesia and 
South Africa, are less wealthy and are growing more slowly economically, but 
are still among the better-off among developing countries and thus capable of 
supporting indigenous innovation.  The only large GHG emitters among the 
very poor developing countries are those experiencing rapid deforestation, 
such as in central Africa.  Technical innovation in agriculture and cooking may 
be important to slow deforestation and thus reduce GHG emissions in those 
very poor countries (in order to reduce demand for converting forests to 
farmland, and for clearing forests for fuelwood, respectively).  Some of this 
innovation may come from elsewhere and be transferred to these countries, 
but even here there are prospects for indigenous innovation in farming and 
cooking methods. 
Second, the wealthier developing countries already have large communities 
of well-educated professionals working in R&D.  China and India are already 
home to a large percentage of the world’s scientists and engineers.  Brazil is 
already a world leader in liquid fuel technologies.  This human capital 
advantage in high GHG-emitting developing countries is the opposite of the 
human capital deficit in poor countries seeking pharmaceuticals for destitute 
poplations. 
Third, credit is available to finance indigenous R&D.  At least some of these 
emerging powers, most obviously China, have large pools of available credit.  
China created a new sovereign investment fund in 2007 endowed with 
approximately $400 billion, and in early November 2008 announced a new 
domestic infrastructure investment initiative of $586 billion over the next two 
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years.86  Foreign investors will add to these financial markets.  This trend may 
be reinforced if the current credit market problems in the US and Europe 
continue and come to make investment opportunities in China, India and 
Brazil seem relatively more attractive. 
Fourth, there is a nascent community of venture capital firms already at work 
in China and other major developing countries.  This source of financing and 
entrepreneurial insight can be critical to small start-up firms. 
Fifth, there is at least domestic demand for innovation to reduce emissions.  
As China adds a new coal-fired electric power plant each week (and India 
adds one about every other week), its coal combustion yields not only CO2 
but also SO2, NOx, fine particulates, and black carbon.87  The public health 
damage from these co-pollutants is serious (in China, up to 750,000 deaths 
per year).88  Moreover, this public health burden is increasingly recognized by 
those countries’ leaders as both a drag on economic growth89 and a source of 
political unrest.90  Thus political leaders in these countries have incentives to 
promote domestic public R&D spending to reduce these emissions; and 
domestic pollution control policies in these countries may spur private 
investment in such domestic innovation.   
Sixth, if the demand-side market failure of climate change is corrected with a 
price on carbon (via carbon taxes or a cap and trade regime), and if that 
policy applies to the major developing countries, then there will be incentives 
for innovation within those countries to reduce GHG emissions.  For example, 
there would be incentives to reduce CO2 emissions from coal combustion 
(via, e.g. carbon capture and storage), and CH4 emissions from natural gas 
pipelines, ruminant animals and rice cultivation.  If indigenous innovation can 
reduce these emissions at lower cost than through imported external 
innovation, the country would benefit from lower abatement costs (and from 
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the opportunity to sell emissions allowances on the world market, if a cap and 
trade regime is adopted). 
Seventh, several countries may serve as role models.  These countries have 
recently succeeded in stimulating indigenous technological innovation as part 
of their vault from poor to wealthy, including admission to OECD membership.  
For example, in the last three decade in South Korea and on Taiwan have 
demonstrated that indigenous innovation in manufacturing, electronics, 
biomedicine, and related industries can be part of rapid economic growth in 
Asia.   
These factors are already spurring increased innovation in the energy sector 
in major developing countries.  In China, innovation has accelerated in recent 
years.91  This trend is publicly associated with President Hu Jintao’s 
commitment to “harmonious society” and the “scientific concept of 
development.” 
To be sure, future progress in green or climate-friendly indigenous innovation 
in developing countries will depend on several factors.  One is the effective 
demand for new methods of reducing GHG emissions as a result of policies 
to raise the price of emissions.  A second is the reach of this demand across 
diverse sectors in which several GHGs are emitted, including electricity 
generation, vehicles, buildings, agriculture, and forests.  A third is the role of 
IPRs or alternatives within these countries in stimulating the supply of new 
technologies, as discussed in prior sections of this paper.92  A fourth is the 
general ease of doing business within these economies.93 
Thus, it will be important to study the design of IPRs or alternatives to 
encourage green climate-friendly technological R&D in major developing 
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countries, as well as in wealthy countries.94  Lessons from the performance of 
IPRs in energy and agricultural sectors in wealthy countries may be useful in 
this effort, provided that the different economic and social context of each 
developing country is understood. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
In this report, we provide an analysis of how IPRs, and alternatives to IPRs, 
might operate in green innovation.  Because IPR challenges are likely to arise 
(if at all) only after sufficient levels of innovation have been generated by a 
combination of appropriate GHG pricing and public funding, we rely heavily 
on analogies to existing technological sectors that are currently experiencing 
difficulties. In addition, because over 95% of global R&D is currently 
generated in OECD countries, we focus on these countries in our discussion 
of IPR challenges.  However, if climate change is going to be addressed 
successfully, clean technology must be adopted globally.  Thus, our paper 
concludes by examining at some length the international context.    
  
 
Source: Clarke et al. (2006, p. 6.5). 
Figure 1. Cumulative global mitigation costs under alternative technology scenarios 
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Figure 2: From Clean Energy Patent Growth Index (U.S.) 
 
 
